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The Lake Chad Basin and Cooperative Security Agenda of Joint Military Taskforce

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Abstract
Recent events around the Lake Chad Basin have shown that the fluid nature of the region is a threat to the Sahel and other parts of Africa. This paper examines the cooperative security agenda of the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, with focus on the issues and challenges of the counter-insurgency in order to explore the threats and risks posed by the insurgents to the security regime aimed at containing cross-border cooperation around the Lake Chad Basin. The security community exists as a confederation to contain the threats of insurgency and climate change, and crime risks which affect border security. Using key informant interviews involving MNJTF stakeholders and qualitative documents from the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the paper adopts the theoretical bridging approach, including theory of territory, confederacy and responsibility to protect. The paper argues that most threats to the stability of countries and, by extension, the peacefulness of Lake Chad Basin are traceable to ungoverned spaces, which can only be contained through sustained security governance around the borders. The paper recommends that member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission should prioritise countering the threats to environmental stability and food security within the Lake Chad Basin. While facilitating inter-basin water transfer, state security providers should maximise the use of strategic places that outlawed security providers have already taken over.
Keywords: Confederacy, Security community, Cross-border cooperation, Lake Chad, Ungoverned spaces

Introduction

The Postcold War world has spawned new and more intractable

conflicts within rather than between states. This has Justified International Community's right to react and intervene in the affairs of another state. The threat of outlaw security providers is one of the factors responsible for the mobilisation of security forces by the forces of order in the form of special operations to contain disturbances (Ashkenazi, 2013; Nwobueze and Okolie-Osemene, 2017). The trend also propelled various governments to increase budgetary allocations to their armed forces as they embarked on security sector reforms and arms procurement in their bid to contain the emerging threats to national security. This explains why security agenda dominated most of the bilateral relations that climaxed in agreements in recent times. In other words, the rapidly increasing footprints of non-state extremist armed groups made many states to consider utilising the platform of regional and sub-regional organisations to set up security regimes for peace and stability purposes (Okolie-Osemene, 2017; Albert, 2017a; Okolie-Osemene, 2018). The cooperative security agenda is state-centric response to insurgency and terrorism that now ravage most African states to the extent that they are gradually losing their tourist attraction value owing to their rising fragility and poor positioning on the global peace index.

According to Luckham and Kirk (2012), security, which refers to the bedrock of state security, is citizen security, a discourse of order and risk-avoidance. It offers insight into how states and non-state actors promote human and national security. The negative spillover effects of insecurity explain why developed states and international organisations invest heavily in improving security provision in fragile environments (Veen, 2014).Feldstein (2018) observes that with the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which deployed over 6,000 troops in 46 locations, the establishment of forward operating bases, cooperative security and contingency locations are the manifestations of stability operations in response to the activities of non-state armed extremist groups.

Terrorists moderately increased in sub-Saharan Africa since 2007 and decreased significantly after the peak in 2014-2015. So far, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have consistently adopted terror tactics to sustain their insurgencies against governments in their areas of operation. In some cases, the lethal violence and associated insecurity necessitated external intervention in the form of foreign assistance to the armed forces of these countries in the areas of weapons, training and intelligence. Notable countries that increased their footprints are USA and France. Many countries have also gone beyond the regional solution to seek the support of the Group 7 countries, especially the USA, France and their allies, in order to nip insurgency in the bud.


The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) is one of the largest fresh water bodies in Africa, shared by eight countries, namely Algeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and the Sudan (Mustapha, 2018). Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad are directly located within the lake. Various factors are responsible for the rising insecurity in the area since the 1980s. These include population growth, budgetary problems of the

states around the area, the resulting" structural adjustments, urbanisation, the crisis in pastoralist societies (notably the Fulani) and the influx of automatic weapons and battle-hardened men from vanquished armies in Niger's and Chad's wars (International Crisis Group, 2017). To a great extent, extremist insurgents have been able to take advantage of these poor human development priority and threats in the area.

Recent events around the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) revealed that parts of Africa are threatened by the activities of non-state actors. Since the escalation of the insurgency in territories of the LCB countries, over 30,000 people have died, more than 1.6 million people have become refugees and displaced, and 4.2 million people are threatened by food insecurity and other humanitarian problems (Besheer, 2017; Atangana, 2018). Insurgency has caused unusual migration, reduced fishing activities, food insecurity and underdevelopment (Mustafa, 2018). Based on member states' responsibility to protect their citizens and territory, the member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission initiated a security community for a safer LCB. The security regime is based on defence and geographical necessity achievable through collective security governance of their territories. The LCB's rising security threats propelled cooperative security agenda of the MNJTF in the form of security community. The multinational nature of this security community is evident in the collaborative efforts of the armed forces of member states of the LCMB. The MNJTF is a regional security regime which motivates the collaboration of different security agencies in member states, especially the military, to contain the threats to security across the borders. The MNJTF has the mandate of African Union's Peace and Security Council aimed at countering the threat of Boko Haram insurgency across the LCBC countries. When the Lake Chad Basin Commission was created in 1964, counter-insurgency was not part of the responsibility. Water management and interstate cooperation dominated its activities. Insurgency forced the organisation to embark on the cooperation for peace and security.

This is a qualitative study that got data from key informant interviews conducted with soldiers involved in the counter-insurgency, security experts, and secondary sources. The speeches delivered by the leaders of the countries of LCB during the opening ceremony and high-level session at the 2018 Lake Chad Basin Commission International Conference, particularly the welcome address by the Vice President of Nigeria, speeches by Presidents of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Gabon, were also studied. The outcome of the sessions was the presentation of a road map on saving the Lake Chad Basin, called Abuja Declaration 2018. The international conferences on Lake Chad Basin, in Nice, France (June 2017) also aided the data collection process. Data were content-analysed.

Map of Lake Chad



Source: Mega Tchad Network
http://www.megatchad.net/map.html

Theoretical Framework

The issues related to the collaborative security agenda can be examined from different perspectives. However, this paper discusses the topic with the theory of territory, confederacy and responsibility to protect.

Theory of Territory

The theory of territory, as propounded by Moore, usually described as political theory of territory, sees groups as crucial stakeholders in territorial right-holding, and explores the control over borders and resources within a geographical location (Moore, 2015). This manifests in the relationship between different stakeholders whose status may be unequal, with one attempting to dominate the available contestable space within a territory. It is argued that in the event of insecurity occasioned by such contestation, the moral right of occupancy which gives the basic right to live in a place, people's moral entitlement to reside in the area would witness unusual threat (Moore, 2001).

When state security providers and non-state actors compete to control a territory, it is the civilians residing within the affected area that would feel the direct impact of such high-risk competition. This occurs as a result of retaking and controlling of the territory. Non-state actors take advantage of the failure of state security providers to control parts of a territory by usurping state's territorial right to the detriment of the inhabitants; and any group that is able to impose order would gain territorial right with the possibility of a "might is right" "argument, which is contrary to international law (Moore, 2015; Taylor, 2016).

The territorial right control struggle is aimed at curbing the problem of ungoverned spaces to enhance state control in an era of insecurities like counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, stabilization and increasing necessity

for peace building (Taylor, 2016; Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010). Currently, migration across borders is equated with crime, which motivates the mobility policies initiated by developed nations to regulate migration, with the aim of reducing movements of people who are desperate to enter countries with buoyant economies (Oshita, 2010;Abram et al., 2017). This theory is relevant to the issue of countering insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin, which has member states as the forces of order to safeguard their territories against the activities of non-state actors, which undermine the trans-border security initiatives of the security providers.

Confederacy and Responsibility to Protect

Confederacy theory explains how communities are established by actors in the international political system in order to use such confederacy as a platform to work for stability and peace. It has an integration component in interstate relations, where states create bonding and the confederate system to protect citizen's welfare, avert and end mass atrocities. As noted by Karl Deutsche, who is one of the founding fathers of modern integration and confederacy theory, integration is the attainment within a territory of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. Joseph Nye identified significant efforts of regional political organisations creating the islands of peace in the international system (cited in Thomas, 2000:29). This is a theory that contains an appreciable dose of normative social engineering in addition to the guidelines it provides for empirical observation of integrative behaviour (Thomas, 2000).

Given the fact that no government has every requirement in the areas of manpower and resources to handle contemporary security threats (Albert, 2017b), confederacy motivates states to initiate state-centric and result-oriented measures to eradicate the roots of conflicts through a security community that evolves into an integrated community which prohibits recourse to armed conflicts (Deutsche, Karl W. 1957), With their collective efforts, this platform of confederacy is utilised in countering the activities of non-sate actors whose transnational security threat is problematic.

According to Elmi (2008), a confederation is a governmental structure whereby two or more independent states enter a treaty for reasons of mutual trade, defence, political rapprochement and/or geographical necessity. A confederate system can be formed by states that are members of different regional organisations in the form of a supranational body based on specific interests. As noted by Anamgba (2000:39), this theory states that:

> Under the system, each confederating state or nation retains its political independence and sovereignty, even as they establish economic, political and security relationship with effective organs of administration. This means that the confederating states are more powerful than the confederal

government (just like ECOWAS and SADC member states).

The Responsibility to Protect offers insight into how state actors collaborate with other states under the auspices of regional organisations to curb the violation of human rights through timely conflict management. This responsibility has the backing of UN, as Article 24 of the UN Charter mandates the Security Council to take responsibility of maintaining global peace and security. As rightly noted by Ikelegbe (2003:53), "the state is the agency for resolving and managing conflicts." The Responsibility to Protect, invoked in the process of drafting the UN Resolution 1973, was established in the wake of the Rwandan Genocide and the Srebrenica Massacre, in order to prevent recurrence of the horrors that took place in those countries (Fontan, 2011).

The doctrine of the "*Responsibility to Protect"* was first elaborated in 2001 by a group of prominent international human rights leaders comprising the **International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty**. The Commission sought to undertake the twofold challenge of reconciling the international community's responsibility to address massive violations of humanitarian norms and ensuring respect for the sovereign rights of nation states. Led by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, the Commission issued its report in December 2001.

With focus on the "right of humanitarian intervention", the report examined the appropriate time for state actors to adopt a coercive –and in particular military– action, against another state for the purpose of protecting populations at risk. In essence, the group concluded that, when a group (or groups) of people, is suffering from egregious acts of violence resulting from internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state where these crimes are taking place is unable or unwilling to act to prevent or protect its peoples, the international community has a moral duty to intervene to avert or halt these atrocities from occurring (R2P, 2001).

Six principles regulate the Responsibility to Protect, namely: just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, which means that intervention must be in line with the magnitude of the problems, reasonable prospects, and right authority, which means that it must have approval of the Security Council or General Assembly, as the case may be (Evans, 2006). The remarkable conflict management efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate the recognition amongst ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) member states of their responsibilities that sovereignty imposes on them in addition to the rights that these responsibilities reinforce through collective regional intervention (Fayemi, 2004). Evans (2006:4) outlines the obligations of organisations in the R2P thus:

i. The responsibility to prevent; by addressing the root and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises that subject citizens to avoidable risks;
ii. The responsibility to react; by responding to situations of compelling human need with

appropriate measures, which could involve coercive measures, including sanctions, prosecution, military intervention.

iii. The responsibility to rebuild after a crisis: by providing assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation. This is done to address the causes of the harm such intervention was designed to avert and satisfy the obligation of the international community to a crisis turn country.

The MNJTF is a composition of LCBC countries which has the support of the EU and the authority of the African Union. The rationale for this theoretical bridging is that, through their responsibility to protect citizens and territories by the collaboration with other states to contain the threats that are intractable, the problem of insurgency is confronted. With this sense of community, it would be difficult for such threats to overwhelm states, thus ending mass atrocities once and for all.

The Rationale for Cooperative Security

The following are the rationale for cooperative security:

1. to suppress insurgents and their tactics;
2. to have a common front and formidable operations against the group;
3. to address the problem of under-governed spaces and strengthen security governance;
4. for safety of contractors in the execution of inter-basin modern water transfer projects
5. for speedy achievement of the short-term, medium-term and long-term goals of the Abuja Declaration on the road map for Lake Chad;
6. stability of LCB to reduce displacement;
7. to safeguard UNESCO world heritage identity and tourist value of Lake Chad; and
8. needed partnership to suppress insurgents' fundraising and arms proliferation

The leadership of the MNJTF from 2015 to date (Theatre Commanders)
Maj. Gen. Iliya Abbah (2015-2016)
Maj. Gen. Lo Adeosun (2016-2017)
Maj. Gen. Lucky Irabor (2017-2018)
Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Attahiru (2018-2021)
Maj. Gen. Nicholas Rogers (2021 todate)

Sectors of Operation

The MNJTF's security community has components similar to what McCormack (2018) describes as 3Ds'of defence, development and diplomacy. These components are critical in determining the future of Lake Chad Basin as far as sustainable livelihoods and regional stability are concerned. With headquarters of MNJTF at Camp 27, Farcha in Ndjamena, Chad, there are four sectors as outlined by the MNJTF:

Sector 1: This is the Cameroonian axis of the counter-insurgency. With sub-sectors, the headquarters is located in Mora, Cameroon, where the 4th Joint Military Region coordinates the activities of the brigade.

Sector 2: This sector is equivalent to the Chadian Brigade of the MNJTF that

corresponds to the 4th Military Regiment of Chad. Headed by a Brigadier General, it is divided into two sub-sectors, with headquarters in Bagasola.

Sector 3: This sector consists of Nigerian 7 Brigade in Baga. In charge of the whole Northeastern Nigeria, it is sub-divided into 4 sections that correspond to 4 battalions. A Brigadier General heads the sector.

Sector 4: The 5th Military Regiment of Niger has its headquarters in Diffa with responsibility for countering insurgency along the Koumadougou-Yobe area.

With all these sectors, it is easier to plan and coordinate the activities and operations of the MNJTF, which is a platform for collaborative security initiative aimed at routing the insurgents whose tactics continue to undermine the grand strategy of troops. So far, the sectors have brought the security forces closer to the insurgents in a belligerent manner, making it easier for them to push the insurgents out from their safe havens and recover the territories they occupy. With several slogans, the troops advocate people shunning violence and seeking peace and pursuing it in order to provide the security of the people for the actualisation of sustainable development of the Lake Chad Basin. The MNJTF effort is seen as service to humanity.

Issues and Challenges of the MNJTF Operations

The trans-border nature of the insecurity in the LCB has been noted by Albert (2017c).The Lake Chad Basin countries face collective security threat. This has contributed to a situation where potential foot soldiers who became members of the Boko Haram movement, including rural and urban peasants, lost their farming, fishing and other agricultural vocations occasioned by the drying up of Lake Chad. This collective threat motivated cooperative security agenda for stability operations. According to Albert (2017b), this security regimen is not dependent on the regional economic communities (RECs); rather, it is based on the pooling of the military and financial resources of the member states to ensure their collective security.

Many member states of LCBC are in a quagmire, which Aras (2017:7) describes as the "enemy-threat chain". This threat propelled security collaboration for the needed partnership against the insurgents. Their access to sophisticated weapons emboldened them to confront a coalition of states around Lake Chad Basin, with the MNJTF struggling to contain them. Albert (2017b:2) notes this in the context of (in)security in Africa:

> Troublemakers now have easier access to surplus arms and light weapons, a large pool of unemployed and frustrated youth to recruit as their foot soldiers and a large expanse of 'ungoverned spaces' to be used as safe havens.

Containing the threat and risk faced by many troops, such as individual and unit risk factors, is necessary. Notable unit risks are: high incidence of soldier and civilian deaths occurring in the same area of operation and over a short period of time, existence of enemies indistinguishable from innocent civilians, shortage of manpower, and the perception of lack of support from

higher command (Sharma, Ratman and Madhusudhan, 2016). These unit risks have characterised MNJTF operations, considering the casualties and challenges confronting troops. Overcoming these threats and stressors in combat theatre would require the commanders boosting the morale of troops to enable them to succeed.

The challenge of being under strength in terms of numerical size and firepower limits the performance and success of troops, as the number of insurgents cannot be ascertained in battle; the insurgents having no common front, as they appear in their thousands to confront hundreds of soldiers who are positioned in lines. Through various activities, such as cordon, stop-and-search, use of sand bags to support fortified areas, and vehicular patrols, troops have the insurgents as threats to the success of their operations. The insurgents threaten their operations, as they attempt to advance in order to gain control of more parts of the territory in a bid to claim such areas as sphere of influence. These soldiers have land mines to overcome, using drones and other means to detect bombs planted by the insurgents in villages they use as battle fields against the MNJTF troops.

Intelligence problem: Intelligence is necessary. The 2016 caution by Nigeria's Defence Headquarters on the escapee insurgents portrays the thorny security challenge in communities located around the LCB, particularly as displaced Boko Haram members tend to disguise as hunters, herdsmen, vigilantes and menial workers to infiltrate communities.

There is the need to address this intelligence problem. The construction of underground armouries by the insurgents in different parts of Northeastern Nigeria has given the insurgents strategic advantage despite the mop-up operations initiated by counter-insurgents because these armouries have continued to aid their activities. For instance, troops were able to discover 80 General Purpose Machine Guns, 10 rifles, tubes of Rocket Propelled Grenades and Launchers, uniforms of security agencies, and protective clothing in Balmo forest in Borno State (Ekwere, 2014; *Nigerian Tribune*, 2014). The purpose of burying weapons is to conceal them from being recovered or destroyed by the troops. If not discovered, such weapons would have enhanced their attack capability, with the uniforms enhancing their tactics against the security forces. But proper inter-agency security collaboration by the countries will enhance security governance across the territories, thereby making it difficult for insurgents to establish safe havens where they would want to launch attacks on people.

A notable issue is the necessity for intelligence agents and the irony of stop-and-search operations. The capability of residents to function as intelligence agents cannot be ignored. This is because there are insurgents who hide in the day to escape security forces and constitute threat to troops and civilians at night. This shows why and how it is crucial for the local communities to assist security forces in the area of information gathering. It was found that insurgents do not have specific strategies. They continue to change their ways and areas of

operation. But with intelligence, the troops would learn more about the modus operandi of the Boko Haram members. A place that once gave insurgents strategic advantage would be a nightmare to them when intelligence is used to overrun them. It would reverse their capturing of some territories, which Albert (2017a) describes as forest taking and forest holding, with the forces of order struggling to keep the insurgents in a disadvantaged position.

Concerning weapon-procurement capability and dependence on developed states, the member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission are not self-reliant in the area of procurement of weapons needed to equip the MNJTF in response to the insurgency. This shows that their procurement policies centre on accessing foreign weapons directly from the international security market dominated by their allies. Aminu (1986:80) asserts that "an important element of defence policy is the ability to properly equip the armed forces to enable them perform (sic) their assigned duties." Without high priority for adequate weapons, security forces would become preys in the hands of their enemies. Separately, some member states embark on bilateral agreements with the USA, France and Britain for the purpose of purchasing arms and fighter jets. For instance, this defence need dominated the agenda of Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari's visit to USA and the press conference with President Donald Trump in 2018. A notable problem is that insurgents have been able to match the capability of the military task force using sophisticated weapons that cost troop's casualties and destruction of weapons.

The numerical strength of the troops in the MNJTF seems to fall short of the personnel required to match the ever-increasing number of insurgents. The defence size and budget of these countries point to the fact that what they offer to the MNJTF is far below the requirement to equip the force in containing the transnational security threat.

There is information gap in the counter-insurgency. Lack of knowledge of the enemy and enemy's habits, such as tactics and weapons, also creates difficulty in the counter-insurgency. Some of the informants revealed that soldiers get only 20% of information from the locals/residents. An officer in the army asserted thus: "we are not magicians; we need residents in local communities, youths, elders and women to feed us with information" (Interview, 2018). Consequently, troops fight in places which they do not know much about. They source information about the operational oversight of the insurgents. They vet information and the sources of the information to avoid enemy traps in view of how insurgents sometimes make residents deceive troops in order to obstruct advancement of security forces to locations where insurgents are camping.

The insurgents have made the leading of battle by unit commanders riskier than expected. Apart from the land mass, terrain and mine clearance problems, troops cannot liberate communities and remain there. They must advance to volatile areas. The problem is that insurgents tactically regroup and retake villages that were liberated. With the purchase of bomb

detectors to aid stop-and-search operations in high-risk areas, soldiers also have blue cloth added to the top of their uniforms in order to differentiate them from the insurgents who appear in military uniform. In view of the fact that junior commanders are instrumental to the success of counter-insurgency, especially in leadership and military psychology, the challenges encountered with unit members and the threats of insurgent tactics must be addressed by the Ministries of Defence in LCBC countries.

The troops have endeavoured to initiate frequent clearance operations to demolish the camps of the insurgents. They sustain successes by ensuring that they do not lose hold of any recovered community. They go as far as embarking on foot and vehicular patrols to prevent any strategic advantage by the insurgents. The soldiers must be cautious before they step on ground because of landmines planted by the insurgents. According to the informants, "armoured cars climbed bombs and exploded, killing the soldiers inside. The risks make tanks to fire before troops advance around Cameroonian border areas with Chad and Nigeria."

Also, the then Force Commander of the MJTF, Major Gen. Lucky Irabor, confirmed that the strength of Boko Haram is now limited to forests and islands, but the insurgents have not stopped threatening many border communities to the extent that MNJTF initiated patrols along waterways to thwart the regrouping of the insurgents in the ungoverned spaces (Irabor, 2018). The strategic significance of food provision manifests in troop's escort of food supplies to mobile kitchen to secure foodstuffs and also guard those responsible for cooking the meals for soldiers. It is done to prevent insurgents from hijacking foodstuffs in their bid to frustrate military strategies. As identified by the high-level session on Abuja Declaration (2018), insurgency would impede data gathering efforts aimed at revitalising the LCB, especially by saving it from shrinking. This means that experts require safety guarantees before embarking on engineering projects targeted at facilitating inter-basin modern water transfer. This would stop the insurgents from driving contractors out of site when they start work.

It was found that there are variations in the intensity of the insurgency, as some areas are more peaceful than others, owing to the capability of the troops to push the insurgents further away from some liberated areas that urgently need sustained security governance. The peacefulness of the communities is dependent on different factors. These include: decline in recruitment rate by the insurgents, reduced arms supplies, readiness of people in communities to cooperate with troops in the area of information sharing. The situation demands the attention of security planners in the MNJTF to examine the counter-insurgency tactics and Boko Haram's manoeuvres in the context of their dexterity in handling weapons, deployment issues, access to the security market, monitoring, and operational efficiency.

A disturbing habit of most important members of LCB is the act of unparalleled irresponsibility in refusing to keep their accounts current. It is humiliating to enjoy representation without taxation. Most members of the

LCB do not release the required fund timely enough for the MNGTF to effectively utilize them for the relevant purposes.

Footprints and concentration of intractable insurgency in LCB: It is remarkable that the Boko Haram insurgents spent many years in the latent stage of their campaign having succeeded in establishing safe havens, recruited foot soldiers and gained access to firearms and explosives, which made them a force to reckon with. The secrecy and political dynamics that characterised this stage ushered them into a period when their audacity to wage multiple attacks from many fronts became more pronounced between 2014 and 2016, when clashes between them and security task force operatives resulted in further lethal incidents which increased threats to security targets, lives and livelihoods and regional stability. This has resulted in displacement of civilians and insurgents as well as humanitarian crisis. The spatial feature of the Boko Haram imbroglio indicates that insurgency can be exported from territory of origin to areas that were safe or had no history of insecurity in daily life.

The Boko Haram insurgency is proving extremely difficult to counter. The insurgence have proved particularly adept at evolving new tactics and have also been singularly successful in suppressing human security and development agenda and efforts. The effects have been to massively delay and hinder economic and social development.

The stakeholders

The stakeholders include:

Theatre Commander
LCBC
Heads of Government
Council of Ministers
Governors of LCBC states
Sector Commanders
Junior commanders
The troops

The troop composition of the Multinational Joint Taskforce is approximately 8,700, as shown below:

S/N	Country	number of troops
1	Armed forces of Nigeria	3,250
2	Armed forces of Niger	Not stated
3	Cameroon defence force	Not stated
4	Armed forces of Chad	Not stated
5	Armed forces of Benin	150
6	Total number of troops	8,700

Source: Adeniyi (2015).




Fig. 1: A bar chart showing the number of troops based on country

The graph shows that the MNJTF troops are approximately 8,700, with Nigeria contributing the highest number. Benin Republic has the lowest number of troops, with 150 deployed to support the member states of the LCBC. Although Benin Republic is not a member of the LCBC, it sees the insurgency as a regional problem that requires multilateral solution rather than viewed as the LCBC affair. Insurgency is no respecter of state borders. It means that despite the misunderstandings and limitations of the R2P concepts, stakeholders must be responsible for providing guidance and resources to ensure an effective MNJTF. Stakeholder's co-operation or confrontation would shape peace and conflict outcomes.

Budget/Funding Contributions of Lake Chad Basin Countries to the Lake Chad Basin Commission

S/No	Country	Percentage of contribution
1	Cameroun	26%
2	Niger	7%
3	Nigeria	52%
4	Chad	11%
5	Central African Republic	4%

Source: CBLT, 2008, cited in Geleazzi, 2017.




Fig. 3: A bar chart showing the percentage contribution based on country

The contribution of these countries shows that budgetary allocations are made in the support of LCBC in order to facilitate its activities aimed at enhancing the development and stability of Lake Chad Basin. Nigeria is the highest contributing country, with over 52% of the funds budgeted, Cameroon supports with 26%, while Chad is the third, with 11% of the funding.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Security provision has become a dominant priority of states around Lake Chad as a result of the insecurity plaguing the area. Containing such threat demands mutual trust and security collaboration, not playing politics with transnational security challenges. After some years of insurgency and humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad, member states of the LCBC have realised that security provision is a task that must be achieved to recover their territories occupied and destabilised by insurgents. The cooperative security agenda for trans-border and territorial security is a model and crucial component of the LCBC's mandate aimed at enhancing the safety of the region. The confederacy championed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission sustains member states' responsibility to protect their territories against the insurgent who have become the enclave's merchants. While the

insurgents desire to make the forces of order abandon their territories in defeat, the MNJTF operates at different sectors to contain the insurgents. The escalation of the insurgent violence created risk for every person transacting business around the lake. It has also exposed the MNJTF troops to the threat of attack by the insurgents. With their presence, many communities in the area now have somewhat security governance that reduced ungoverned space threats. It is obvious that militarism alone cannot restore stability in the area; high priority for surveillance, intelligence and human development to isolate the insurgents through people-oriented security governance and sustainable trust-based diplomatic initiatives is crucial.

The cooperative security is a multi-stakeholder response to the insurgency around Lake Chad Basin. The trans-boundary biosphere reserves and World Heritage Sites, popularly called BIOPALT, which is a US$6,456,000 project financed by the African Development Bank and implemented by UNESCO and LCBC from 2017 to 2020, for the benefit of three million people in Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger and Nigeria, can only be realistic when insurgency is completely contained for sustainability of peace, security and development.

Since the environment sustains healthy, productive and peaceful human living, it is imperative for governments and policymakers to prioritize environmental conservation in their pre- and post-conflict peacebuilding agenda and efforts. This will assist in curbing violent crime, banditry, lawlessness and disorder in the Lake Chad.

Effective regional coordination and command of military operation as well as high level of discipline and patriotism will reduce the burden of violence and security. They will also sustain lives and livelihoods. Ultimately, these will promote regional stability.

Ironically, the five permanent members of the United Nations responsible for preventing the spread of conflicts are today responsible for supplying 85% of the arms that fuel such conflicts. The UN should take significant step towards disarmament and arms limitation.

A new way forward will require the United Nations to learn and perform new tasks, including large-scale humanitarian delivery, demobilizing and retraining soldiers, monitoring elections, establishing safe areas, rebuilding civil institutions, destroying land mines and coordinating economic reconstruction. These tasks must be carried out with increasing expertise.

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