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A Guide to Understanding Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

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Abstract
The words disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) are hardly well understood in ordinary usage and even discourses among security and peace scholars. It is common knowledge that the acronym DDR is wrongly used on daily discourses by the layman and even among security experts who assume that their varied audiences are conversant with the acronym. This portends danger in scholarly discourses, academic publications and practical use among security experts. Aside its usage and adoption, DDR is also known to have strong nexuses with and influence on diverse human and material interests; including society, international best practices, interfaces with natural resources, the contending issue of deradicalisation or disengagement, generations of DDR, etc. The objective of this chapter is to provide a guide to understanding DDR. The chapter makes elucidation and clarifications of concepts, it examines the nexus in DDR to several related themes and subthemes. This enormous task is undertaken through a mixed method approach. Whereas, the chapter concedes to the fact that the diverse interconnected sections it treated are not exhaustive, which compels the need for further research; it succeeded in providing a guide for peacebuilders by clarifying DDR-related concepts, exposes several linkages within the confines of DDR, etc.

Keywords: Approach, Demobilisation, Didactic, Disarmament, Guide, Reintegration.

1. Introduction

"One down, others to follow! Nigerian military troops announce the killing of a notorious bandit leader"; trended as the headline news following the killing of notorious bandit leader and arms supplier, Kachalla Halilu Sububu in North-East, Nigeria (Abiodun, 2024). This victory was celebrated and marked diversely, including the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Christopher Musa, rewarding the gallant troops with N1,000,000 (Yusha'u, 2024). Addressing the troops, the CDS rhetorically asks "who are those ones that did the operation? I am giving you N1m to go and share to show you that we appreciate you" (Yusha'u, 2024, para: 4).

President Ahmed Bola Tinubu, with much relief, was equally full of commendations for the troops for their gallantry, dedication, synergy, valiant efforts that resulted in laudable outcomes like the killing of Kachalla Halilu

Sububu (Lasisi, 2024). Ab initio, Nigerian troops had recorded the killing of several other notorious bandits like Boderi Isyaku, a notorious bandit leader who was both responsible for the kidnapping of 39 students of the Federal College of Forestry Mechanisation and the attack on the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna in 2021, amongst others (Abiodun, 2024).

Whereas these military victories are celebrated over violent extremism (VE) in Nigeria, it has not totally eliminated, overrun, overturned and decimated VE. It is evident that chasing away VE with kinetic force (i.e., hard approaches) is not totally productive; especially, since peacebuilding through hard measures does not build peace (Denskus, 2007; David, 1999; Midlarsky, 2011). The nonceremonial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent return of the Taliban to power attest to this assertion (Zeiden, 2021; CPA, 2024). Ideally, in a war fought by a faceless enemy that is almost difficult to identify, it is better to chase him away with reason(s) rather than with a club. Whereas, kinetic measures have its merits in reclaiming territory occupied by terrorists, violent extremists who look at death as martyrdom definitely requires a different approach - being the necessity to defeat a violent extremist ideology with superior ideology. The real strategy should be that non-kinetic measures that are deliberately designed to tackle the ideas that rationalise VE be adopted because bullet only kills insurgents but does not kill his ideas about neglect, feelings of injustice, exclusionism, corruption, and hatred that ignited him in the first place. It, therefore, beckons on security agencies, governments, donor agencies, civil society groups and the international community to find more effective ways to simultaneously halt the expansion of VE and ultimately to eliminate the drivers and root causes of VE. Whereas countering VE through kinetic measures has recorded giant strides, the biggest deficit is on prevention (USAID, 2020). In realisation of this necessity, the state in Nigeria, under the President Muhammadu Buhari government, introduced the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) programme as a non-kinetic approach in combating Boko Haram insurgency in north-east, Nigeria (Ugwueze, et al, 2021).

When deliberate military and government efforts succeed in enthroning a post-insurgency era, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is set in motion. DDR is the deliberate interventions by government, with support from civil society organisations (CSOs), the international community, including the United Nations, the European Union, etc., to elicit behaviour change. DDR is, particularly, strategic in that it is not only vital to building safe, stable, and harmonious post-conflict frameworks (Dzinesa, 2017); but more, especially, that a return to normalcy is not always signified by the conclusion of a war. The safety of former combatants and civilians is not always guaranteed to improve after an insurgency. In actuality, many so-called post-insurgency eras pose even greater risks to civilian safety than the insurgency era that came before them, both directly and indirectly. The label of "post-insurgency" frequently conceals a wide range of actual and imagined dangers that most post-war societies face (Molloy, 2017).

Usually, the eldorado that used to accompany the signing of peace agreements and the entry into the post-insurgency era is typically replaced by a more worn-out form of pessimism. These situations are largely typical when small arms and light weapons, as well as their users, are not adequately addressed as essential components of peace processes during the post-conflict phase. DDR is seen by counterterrorism initiatives as one of the fundamental tenets in the peace process that replaces armed conflict (Muggah, 2005). Counterterrorism that is based on DDR has gained prominence in security discourses and

in application, states and CSOs have looked for softer, frequently preventive measures to deal with violent extremism, which are often deemed more successful than kinetic approaches and less likely to inspire a new generation of violent extremists.

Worrisomely, in a world where radicalisation is a persistent reality, where some radicals may never abandon their extreme beliefs, and where recidivism is a common occurrence, soft counter-terrorism through DDR creates opportunities for convincing belligerents to desist from violent extremism (VE). While DDR programmes are the most effective way to achieve this kind of advancement, all post-conflict peace processes must be founded on an examination of the nature and underlying causes of the conflict as well as the post-conflict environment where DDR is deemed appropriate.

The objective of this chapter is to provide a guide to understanding DDR in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. It does this through the clarification of various concepts and thematic areas related to DDR that are crucial to post-conflict peacebuilding. It is interested in the challenges and opportunities of establishing a political economy for peace in the aftermath of war; particularly, in "jump-starting" the establishment of a political economy of peace. With a focus on clarifying these ideas, it is hoped to change the conventional perspective associated with DDR-which prioritises achieving security-and take into account achieving both economic and physical security (Spear, 2006).

Beyond this introduction, this chapter, in no particular order, proceeds through interrelated thematic areas of DDR. Whereas Section II examines the motives for adopting soft measures in counterterrorism, Section III examines various enduring themes in DDR discourse. Ethics of Peace Practice is considered in Section IV. Section V discusses barriers to insurgent reintegration. In Section VI issues of DDR and organised crime are discussed. Section VII analyses the role of natural resources in a DDR process. In Section VIII, the chapter considers the salience of international peace standards to DDR. Section IX examines the place of cash payment in DDR. Section X considers the strengths and weaknesses of DRR. Section XI concludes the chapter.

2. Rationales for Adopting Soft Measures in Counterterrorism

Several explanations justify the call for adopting non-kinetic measures (i.e., soft approaches) in chasing away VE. First, there are far more terrorists today than there were before 9/11 attacks on United States homeland. Second, the 2009 police killing of Boko Haram founder and leader, Mohammed Yusuf, never halted the operations of the Boko Haram sect. The state execution of the environmentalist, Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa did not halt insurgency in the Niger Delta. Instead, “if for every terrorist killed or captured, there are ten more in line waiting to take his or her place, however, successful we may be killing or capturing terrorists, we will not stem the tide” (Nwolise, 2016, p. 7). More insurgents and militants have respectively taken-up the messages and ideas been propagated by Boko Haram sect and Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa.

Third, if learning from other climes is permissive, a Kenyan proverb readily affirms that “the one chased away with a club comes back, but the chased away with reason does not” (Nwolise, 2016, p. 6). It attests to the necessity for adopting non-kinetic measures in combating VE. Fourth, kinetic approaches only succeed in killing the insurgents, belligerents, separatists, terrorists, militants, and irredentists but fail to tackle the ideas that make VE as an option amount to futility in military action, resource and manpower deployment (Nwolise, 2016). VE is essentially a battle of ideas. These ideas are passed on from generation to

generation. To kill ideas is never an easy matter and definitely ideas are not killed by bullets alone. If the 1999 military attack on Odi Community in Bayelsa State, had solved the issue of militancy in the Niger Delta, the Yar'Adua Government would not have come up with the Presidential Amnesty Programme.

Fifth, guns and ammunition alone cannot stop VE; but some level of purposeful dialogue. VE manifesting in diverse forms like terrorism is a warped ideology and one cannot kill it with gun alone (Nwolise, 2016, p. 6). Compelled by these premises, Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary General, cautions that:

> we are living in dangerous times. Protracted conflicts are causing unspeakable human suffering. Armed groups are proliferating, equipped with a vast array of weapons. As armed conflicts grow more deadly, destructive and complex, we need a new focus on disarmament that saves lives, humanity, the future of generations. (UN, 2018, p. vii)

3. Enduring Themes in DDR Discourse

a. DDR: Definitions, Concepts and Terms

For as long as there has been warfare, societies have faced the issue of what to do with combatants after hostilities end (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis, 2010). It is worthy of note that the cessation of hostilities following from international wars do not attract the fear that ex-combatants would threaten public order; the stability of an already established peace or the consolidation of gains made in peace processes nearing their conclusion, however, are threatened by the existence of former combatants with few options other than to continue using their violent skill sets after civil wars end. When insurgents are not rehabilitated and reintegrated into society, there is a perceived risk of a return to violence, which is why DDR has frequently been the succour, solution and path used. DDR process while guided by the broad objective of contributing to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin, its particularly intended to:

i. "contribute to security and stability by facilitating reintegration and providing the enabling environment for rehabilitation and recovery to begin;

ii. restore trust through confidence-building among conflicting factions and with the general population; help prevent or mitigate future violent conflict;

iii. contribute to national reconciliation;
iv. and free up human and financial resources, and social capital, for reconstruction and development" (UNDP, 2012, p. 11).

To achieve these objectives the DDR process should, therefore be:

i. "planned and coordinated within the framework of the peace process;

ii. linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues;

iii. made to take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, and weapons control and management;

iv. linked to the broader processes of national capacity-building, reconstruction and development in order to achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants;

v. encourage trust and confidence in communities receiving ex-combatants, and deal with the root causes of the conflict in order to prevent a return to violent conflict; and,

vi. flexible and carefully adapted to meet the

specific needs of a particular country (UN, 2010, p. 24).

This section offers an introduction to the scholarly foundations of DDR, identifying the beginnings of the specific practice of DDR, and expatiating on concepts related to a critical examination and clarification of DDR.

I. Difficult to Define

DDR is not readily defined by the peace-scholar community. However, available scholarly definition point to the fact that DDR is an intricate web of interrelated political, military, security, humanitarian, and socioeconomic processes. Altier (2021, p. 10) describes DDR as a measure "to reduce the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence by removing weapons from society (disarmament), breaking command and control links or the readiness for violence (demobilisation), and ensuring ex-combatants' successful transition into civilian life or the state's security forces (reintegration)". The Cartagena Group (2009, p. 15) defines DDR as:

> a set of activities, interventions and operations carried out primarily by international agencies, particularly the United Nations (from an emphasis on security issues) and the World Bank (from a predominantly development perspective) …aimed to handle the needs of societies in a post-conflict context, yet initially lacked a theoretical framework, a body of principles or a set of technical recommendations for action. They were essentially developed by trial and error in response to crisis situations.

Apparently, DDR scholarship lacks a consensus definition; however, what is obvious is that DDR has specific objectives that it works assiduously to attain in any post-conflict environment it is adopted. For example, the main objectives of any DDR endeavour are, as afore-stated, to ensuring security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin; reestablishing trust through confidence-building amongst conflicting factions and with the general public; aiding in the prevention or mitigation of future violent conflict; supporting national reconciliation; and freeing up human, financial, and social capital for reconstruction and development all contribute to security and stability (UNDP, 2012). Apparently, DDR is an essential component in stabilising any post-conflict environment after the signing of a peace agreement.

The DDR of former insurgents is a multifaceted process with socioeconomic, political, military, and security aspects. It seeks to address the post-conflict security issue that emerges when former fighters are left without means of subsistence or social support systems outside of their former allies during the crucial transitional phase from conflict to peace and development. DDR aims to assist former insurgents so they can take an active role in the peace process by removing weapons from their possession, removing them from military structures, and assisting them in their social and economic integration.

This is how DDR builds the capacity for long-term peace, security, and development while preserving and advancing the communities where these people can live as law-abiding citizens. It is crucial to remember that DDR by itself cannot end a conflict or stop violence; but it can aid in creating a safe atmosphere in which other components of a recovery and peace-building plan can be implemented.

ii. Evolution of DDR: First, Second and Third Generation

When did DDR start and who wrote the early theory? it is being gathered from early and mature practitioners that DDR was first used by

the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). This was in the context of post–Cold War security readjustments that culminated in what Dean Piedmont called "proxy DDR" or a type of DDR that occurred by default (Molloy, 2017). Interestingly, the birth of scholarly works on DDR was pioneered by Varas and his colleagues in their seminal work titled, Confidence-Building Measures in Latin America (Varas, et al, 1995). Overall, this seminal work; which refers to DDR as Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are a collection or the totality of "agreed military or non-military measures to enhance mutual understanding, convey non-hostile intentions, define acceptable norms of behaviour and allay excessive fears and suspicions…are flexible instruments and are best tailored to local conditions" (Krepon, 1995, p. iii).

Orchestrated by the series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Central America during the mid-1980s and early 1990s; DDR usually happens in conflict environments after related circumstances like a comprehensive political settlement between warring factions under international supervision such as that of the UN in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Guatemala, El-Salvador, Mozambique; a clear government victory like in Ethiopia and Eritrea; or state fragmentation when external actors force it like in Somalia and Mali (Tulchin & Aravena, 1998).

In terms of procedures, DDR aims to, following a peace accord and ceasefire, demilitarise, reduce, resize, and professionalize former armies and non-statutory armed groups. DDR processes, because of their specific historical roots, usually have a primary target caseload that includes former combatants and their dependents. Other identified participants include disabled ex-combatants, children connected to armed groups, and people connected to armed groups who are not involved in combat. In practice, DDR typically uses more developmental methods for reinsertion and reintegration and primarily draws on defense and security-related expertise for the disarmament and demobilisation processes (Bryden & Scheerrer, 2012).

iii. Generations of DDR

Generations are simply models in addressing state and non-state armed groups through DDR (USAID, 2020). Peace practice scholarship identifies the following three different generations:

a. First Generation or Classical DDR

The goal of the first wave of DDR interventions was to assist in ending the protracted civil wars that were raging in Southern Africa and Latin America. The general rule of peacekeeping during this time was an end to violence. Their strategy was relatively simple: they planned the cantonment and decommissioning of high-ranking military personnel along with regular soldiers in order to undermine their command and control (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015).

The emphasis on organised military units-rebels or soldiers-meant that it was usually obvious who qualified for and did not qualify for reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Upon obtaining meager compensation and potentially a pension for veterans, former combatants were anticipated to revert to their original communities as civilians. A more limited group of individuals completing DDR programmes were qualified to reapply for admission to recently established security organisations, such as the military (Muggah & O'Donnel, 2015).

Programmes for DDR in this initial wave differed greatly in terms of their scope, scale, and success rate. When DDR interventions were implemented following civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa, they had some positive effects. This was especially true when considering how much they helped to keep violent conflicts from recurring. DDR

procedures, although far from flawless, were remarkably well-organised and executed with military-grade accuracy. But in other situations, the results were not as favourable. In the 1990s, DDR programmes in Cambodia, Haiti, and the Philippines failed to demobilise fighting forces, acquire a sizable arsenal of weapons, or prevent a short-term return to political violence. Nevertheless, experiences were gathered and processed. These later served as the basis for the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which were largely derived from the insights gained from this initial wave (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015).

b. Second Generation DDR

The idea that DDR and reintegration in particular were not accomplishing the desired peacebuilding and development goals gave rise to second generation DDR in the mid-2000s (USAID, 2020). The emphasis of this era has shifted from focusing only on combatants to focusing on community security strategies, justice, and development in order to create lasting peace. Furthermore, practitioners were now working in environments that did not meet the requirements of traditional DDR. For instance, there was no peace agreement in Haiti, and armed political and criminal gangs were free to roam the streets.

Particularly influenced by a study published by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2010), second generation DDR places a strong emphasis on gender equality, community involvement in DDR processes to ensure a decrease in violence, and justice based on rapprochement and reintegration, especially with victims and their communities. However, the tenacity of community driven DDR programmes have received enormous review, evaluation and criticisms (Willemijn, et al, 2010; Walt, 2014).

c. Third Generation DDR

In 2012, the need for DDR in nonpermissive settings-where peace agreements are lacking and communities actively risk being recruited by violent extremist organisations-grew, giving rise to the third generation of DDR (USAID, 2020). As practitioners found themselves working in the midst of offensive counter-insurgency or stability operations within an ongoing war, discussions of third or next generation DDR began to emerge. Third-generation individuals are those who belong to or are affiliated with designated terrorist organisations (DTOs), such as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), and are thus prohibited by law from supporting DTOs. Engaging armed and criminal groups that could be the subject of military operations and are not interested in signing a peace deal is the goal of third generation DDR; as is it in Somalia, Libya, Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

DDR is not always voluntary in these situations, particularly when combatants are in danger of receiving a death sentence or a life sentence. Third generation DDR faces the challenge of reintegrating some violent extremists, such as al Qaeda and ISIS, who reject the legitimacy of the nation-state order and UN because they are seen as advancing Western interests. Although, DDR has always struggled with violent extremists, such as the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), this is not the first time. Additionally, the UN has asked that nations make fighting al Qaeda, its affiliates, or splinter groups illegal.

Groups in general, as well as former combatants connected to them, are not given the legitimacy that characterises and supports DDR procedures. The UN has released special guidelines about how to screen for these people in DDR processes. It also forbids them from taking part in formal DDR, recommending instead that they be prosecuted or participate in alternative rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. In order to address practice outside of UN missions or a comprehensive

peace settlement, the UN Interagency Group on DDR started a thorough review of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) in 2017. This resulted in the 2019 revised IDDRS, which includes initiatives to stop people from joining armed groups designated as terrorist organisations and support programmes for those quitting groups that are compliant with legal guidelines (Altier, 2021; Muggah & O'Donnell, 2016).

iv. Typologies of DDR

The former UN Secretary-General, Koffi A. Annan in his May 2005 note to the General Assembly, officially identified the stages of any DDR process as follows:

a. Disarmament

Disarmament is the process of gathering, recording, controlling, and getting rid of small arms, explosives, ammunition, and light and heavy weapons that are used by combatants and frequently by civilians as well. Creating programmes for responsible arms management is another aspect of disarmament. Coercive and cooperative methods can both be used for disarmament. Cooperative disarmament is more frequently linked to peace agreements in situations where there is no definite winner in a given war. Mozambique and El Salvador are two of the successes. Angola (twice) and Cambodia are two failed attempts at cooperative disarmament. Most frequently, intervention forces-like the U.S. forces in Somalia and India in Sri Lanka-or the obvious winners of civil wars use coercive disarmament. However, the distinction between these two forms of disarmament may become hazy as a result of both peace accords and actual behaviour (Spear, 2002).

The process of disarming insurgents is a carefully thought-out one that starts with disarming them as soon as they arrive at weapons collection points. Other steps in the process include building confidence by creating buffer zones, secure corridors, mutual observation, etc.; conducting a weapons survey is necessary to plan ahead and answer questions like how many weapons are there and who is expected to turn them in; collecting weapons, where each weapon must be registered and other important information like the type of pertinent number and serial number recorded; storing weapons due to a lack of equipment needed for destruction; destroying weapons must take into account safety, cost, effectiveness, and verification of destruction; and reusing weapons needs to be closely monitored to prevent returned weapons from going missing (Gleichmann et al, 2004).

b. Demobilisation

The official and controlled release of combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups is known as demobilisation. The initial phase of demobilisation could involve processing individual fighters in makeshift facilities or gathering troops in camps set aside for that purpose (barracks, cantonment sites, encampments, or assembly areas). Reinsertion, the term for the support package given to the demobilised, is included in the second stage of demobilisation.

The UN General Assembly noted that "demobilising combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilisation, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals-such as democratisation, justice and development-have little chance for success" (UNGA, 2004, p. 61). However, evidence contradicts this. One glaring exception is the 1980 peace deal in Zimbabwe, where the choice to keep the two opposing sides intact was essential to its success (Berdal, 1996).

c. Reinsertion

Assistance provided to former combatants during demobilisation but before the more involved process of reintegration is known as reinsertion. Reinsertion is a type of transitional

support that helps ex-combatants and their families meet their basic needs. This support can take the form of short-term education, training, jobs, food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and transitional safety allowances. Reinsertion is a short-term material or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to a year, whereas reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development.

d. Reintegration

This is the process through which former combatants obtain civilian status, stable employment, and financial support. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process that mostly occurs at the local community level and has an open time frame. It is a national duty and a component of the overall development of a nation, and it frequently calls for sustained outside assistance. A key aspect of reintegration process in any DDR emdeavour remains the reintegration of former belligerents and the sustainability of the peace process. This is because "successful long-term reintegration can make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and to the restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun" (Colletta, et al, 1996, p. 18).

e. De-radicalisation and Disengagement

The terms de-radicalisation and disengagement, though they have different meanings, refer to the processes by which people (or groups) stop participating in organised violence. But whereas de-radicalisation seeks to bring about significant changes in the beliefs and behaviours of individuals or groups-a kind of cognitive shift, or a fundamental shift in understanding-disengagement focuses on helping people change their behaviour, or to stop using violent means. It is a shift in behaviour like quitting a group or taking on a different role within it. It just calls for giving up on the idea of using violence to bring about change, not a shift in beliefs or values.

The disengaged terrorist might not even be repentant or "deradicalised." Physical disengagement frequently does not translate into a corresponding shift in opinion or a decline in support. Additionally, there are differences between individual and collective de-radicalisation or disengagement, depending on who is spearheading the process and if it is directed towards prisoners or terrorist organisations as a whole (Fink & Hearne, 2008). The fundamental principles of disengagement, rehabilitation, and de-radicalisation include:

i. Gender Sensitivity

The participation of women in VE is on the rise everywhere in the world. Consequently, it is important to recognise that both men and women benefit from deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes.

ii. Respect for human rights and the rule of law

Concerned parties and participants in the DDR process are required to abide by international humanitarian law and human rights legislation. Human rights standards from both home and abroad must be cited in the legal and policy framework for VE rehabilitation. Generally speaking, some norms concern the freedom of religion of combatants, their right to legal counsel, and their ability to communicate with their families and the outside world.

iii. Safety and security of the beneficiaries of the programme

It is imperative to guarantee the safety and security of the participants throughout the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme.

iv. Inter-agency synergy

DDR needs to take a comprehensive approach, mapping all the different actors involved in

deradicalising and rehabilitating violent extremist groups. Inter-ministerial and inter-agency cooperation is essential to achieving success.

v. Salience in high-quality intelligence

Quality intelligence is crucial at different phases of DDR implementation. Security and intelligence agencies frequently evaluate target the risks of beneficiaries and determine participant eligibility based on their mandates and territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of assessing the dangers of prison-based VE prior to trial, conviction, and release, they ought to stay in close communication with the intelligence unit of the prison.

vi. Monitoring and evaluation

In order to conduct an impact assessment and produce insightful lessons learned, independent evaluators must be involved at different stages of the rehabilitative strategy.

vi. Role of Stakeholders Involved in DDR

DDR initiatives are a logical progression of peace processes. From the planning to the implementation phases, they thus necessitate a thorough, coordinated, and integrated approach. The three stages DDR are neither distinct nor unrelated to one another. In actuality, overlap in all three phases is possible and typically occurs. The peace process may be in danger if there are issues at any point during the DDR process. Failure to disarm and demobilise former combatants, for instance, may result in a return to hostilities or the emergence of low-level criminal activity, both of which could eventually jeopardize the peace process.

In a bid to achieve the targets of DDR in post-conflict societies, critical stakeholders have remained resolute and have undertaken numerous efforts at DDR. The roles played by critical stakeholders like national governments, international organisations, civil society organisations, etc., have been resounding. This section of the chapter examines the practice of DDR by the following stakeholders:

a. The Role of the UN in DDR

In order to achieve its mission of maintaining world peace and security, the UN has been extremely active. The UN has been so involved in DDR and peacebuilding in general for a number of reasons (Leff, 2008). The complex process of peacebuilding and its DDR components involves a wide range of tasks and multiple, diverse players. The UN is in a good position to provide a number of actors (specialised agencies, departments, funds, and associated bodies) and carry out the range of duties required for DDR processes to be successful due to its universality and international legitimacy. Additionally, it is constitutionally positioned to serve as a link between other DDR actors, including national governments, civil society organisations, regional and subregional organisations, and the Bretton Woods institutions (Knight, 2008).

Historically, in order to prepare proposals for a treaty governing the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) under the Security Council in 1952 by Resolution 502 (VI) of January 1952.

The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee was the first of several organisations that conducted disarmament talks after 1960. This organisation evolved into the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962, and finally the Conference on Disarmament in 1978. A successor Disarmament Commission, made up of all UN Member States, was established as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly in 1978 during the first special session dedicated to disarmament. It was established as a

deliberative body whose duties included considering and recommending on a range of disarmament-related topics as well as monitoring the pertinent decisions and recommendations of the special session. The General Assembly receives It reports annually to the UN General Assembly.

The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change recommended the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission in 2004, demonstrating the UN's ongoing commitment to peacebuilding. At the 2005 UN World Summit in New York City, that proposal and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm were approved. Concurrent resolutions were later passed by the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council to create this new body. In order to improve the UN's capacity to implement DDR programmes in post-conflict peacebuilding operations, this Peacebuilding Commission will help close the institutional divide between peacekeeping and development efforts. Additionally, it promotes the idea of local ownership in DDR processes and adds a degree of coordination to peacebuilding efforts that occur throughout the UN system (Knight, 2008).

With its numerous agencies and affiliated organisations, the UN system is uniquely positioned to handle the challenging task of coordinating the various facets and varied participants in DDR processes. However, nationally coordinated DDR initiatives might ultimately be more successful and yield more durable outcomes.

b. The EU Contributions to DDR

The European Union is heavily involved in both short-term and long-term DDR initiatives. Through the European Commission, the European Development Fund (EDF), the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), and the European Action on Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Explosive Remnants of War, the EU has funded roughly 20 such initiatives in Africa since the early 1990s. EU member states make significant financial contributions to certain DDR programmes that support time-bound, linear demobilisation and reintegration programmes set up by the UN's Trust Fund for DDR and the World Bank's Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP).

For instance, the EU continues to be the largest single donor to Liberia's UN Trust Fund. The EU has contributed $21.9 million (31 percent of the total budget of $71 million) to the trust fund, paid out in three installments. The first installment focused on the National Commission on DDR and reintegration activities, the creation of a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), and the social aspects of demobilisation.

Formal education, agricultural and other income-generating activities, apprenticeships, vocational training, job placement, and small business development were among the reintegration activities funded by the second installment. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) demobilisation process and the reintegration of former combatants into their communities were the designated uses of the third installment. Additionally, the EU plays a significant role in the overall planning of domestic DDR initiatives.

By combining a variety of tools for development, security, stability, democratic governance, and human rights promotion, the EU enhances the UN's DDR processes. The EU is one of the main organisations that supports peace processes, aside from the UN. Its system for providing development, economic, and political assistance is complex. The system can be modified to address the issues-security, governance, social and economic advancement, justice, and reconciliation-that are essential to the success of DDR. In order to carry out DDR programmes, the EU and UN work in tandem with the African Union (AU)

and other continental subregional organisations (Knight, 2008).

c. Civil Society Organisations

The United Nations disarmament infrastructure relies heavily on civil society organisations (CSOs), including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as educators, activists, and change agents. The passion and commitment that CSOs bring to their work can help to spark discussion and advance the agenda in the politically delicate and sluggish fields of disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, where significant results can be difficult to achieve and rarely won. These groups bring fresh perspectives and innovative solutions to the table, maintain the focus on important and developing issues, and-most importantly-strive to hold governments accountable (Street, 2015).

Civil society organisations also increase public awareness and appeal to the conscience in order to promote disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Its work has been crucial in several important areas, such as attempts to control the global trade in conventional weapons, prohibit anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, and stop atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. A noteworthy illustration of the influence of civil society was that the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear-Weapons (ICAN) won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its work on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapons. ICAN, which now has over 650 NGOs spread across 110 countries, has been actively advocating for the Treaty's implementation in 2021 (Clements & Ikeda, 2019; Atidoga & Yakubu, 2024).

The foregoing showcases the various roles played by critical stakeholders in enthroning permanent peace in post-conflict societies. The roles played by the UN and the African Union in DRC (through the Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUC] in 1999); Burundi, Liberia, Côte D'Ivoire, Sierra-Leone (through United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone [UNAMSIL]) and Sudan, etc. remain indelible in Africa.

4. Ethics of Peace Practice in DDR

Peace practitioners use ethics of peace practice in two senses. On one hand, it is used to mean "the values and principles for personal behaviour that build positive interpersonal relationships, credibility, trust, and legitimacy for the work they do" (Anderson & Olson, 2003, p. 28). Conversely, it is referred to as "guides for principled programming for peace" (Anderson & Olson, 2003, p. 28). In certain instances, it refers to the methods and approaches that characterise peace practice, which practitioners use to match their methods with their desired outcomes. Typically, those who practice peace take actions that combat the traits of violent extremism (VE).

Doing DDR mandates certain basic ethics of peace practice; that ask if those interested in the different facets of DDR understand what peace practice is all about, and if they are acting morally? Ethics in peace practice entails that the actions of peacebuilders are guided by ethics, which requires them to recognise that "peace practice is honest; peace practice values life; peace practice is reliable; peace practice respects differences; peace practice eschews violence and intimidation; peace practice commits to justice as essential to peace; peace practice honours that peace belongs to the people who make it" (Anderson & Olson, 2003, pp. 29-37).

Therefore, peacebuilding needs to be a very personal experience rather than just a "professional" skill. Being a peacebuilder and a part of society that engages with peacebuilders both need to be willing to take risks; humility demands that peace practitioners remain humble about their roles. Peace practice involves being willing to step outside of your personal comfort zone. This means that you must be willing to interact with people whose

opinions, lifestyles, and behaviours may differ greatly from your own, and even of a nature that you deeply disagree with.

Specifically, foreign peacekeepers are not entitled to speak for what is "best" for those who suffer from war and its aftermath. Diverse experiences and instances, however, suggest that "very few outsiders are respectful enough of the people they are working with" (Anderson & Olson; 2003, p. 33). But you have to act with humility. This is due to the fact that although you may depart, the locals must remain. It is necessary to give credit for any success to those who actually live in the situation in order to honor the local ownership of any peace process (Anderson & Olson; 2003, p. 33).

5. DDR and Barriers to Insurgent Reintegration

As in any conflict, there are a myriad of reasons that hinder reintegration of insurgents back to society. Former insurgents and soldiers may have a very difficult time finding other employment because they lack the training, experience, and credentials needed for civilian positions (Gear, 2002; Ugwueze et al, 2021). Large-scale studies of Vietnam veterans reveal that, even in a large and stable economy like the United States, the integration of former Vietnam soldiers into the civilian labour market was initially sluggish and that many veterans struggled to find new employment (Specht, 2000; Banholzer, 2014). Thus, after being demobilised, soldiers and rebels start looking for work. Due to the conflict, they join the sizable population of young people without jobs in nations with a dysfunctional economy. This section, with particular reference to northeast Nigeria, discusses key interrelated barriers to reintegration of returnee insurgents, belligerents, combatants, terrorists, etc., to society:

i. Barriers to Return

It is well known that DDR procedures in Africa and elsewhere have put forth great effort to reintegrate rebels into society. Deep divisions exist between the so-called returnee insurgents and the returnee communities, who endured horrific crimes and subsequent displacement at the hands of these groups. For example, in Nigeria, because the government never engaged with communities or established the necessary collaboration with them, communities in northeastern Nigeria during the Operation Safe Corridor programme were antagonistic toward and rejected Boko Haram returnees (Kukah Centre & Conciliation Resources, 2018; Ugwueze et al., 2021). In fact, aggrieved and agitated communities in northeast, Nigeria insisted that the federal government should take the repentant Boko Haram sect members to the various government houses in northeast, Nigeria or Aso Rock, Nigeria's seat of power (Owonikoko & Chan, 2022). A worried community leader said “sometimes you see these people carrying papers showing that they have repented and that they have returned. You begin to ask yourself, how? The entire exercise is a government thing and for it to work, we must be included in its delivery” (Ugwueze et al, 2021, p. 13). Thus, some insurgents are reluctant to go back because they fear reprisals, lack the money to start over, or have had their homes destroyed (Revkin, 2021).

ii. Collective Punishment

DDR places a strong emphasis on the facilitation of many returnees as a prerequisite to reconciliation. In course of the 'Operation-Safe-Corridor' window in northeast Nigeria, it was widely noticed that the greater issue of collective punishment was brought up by the strong reliance on sect and community ties, particularly in cases where it is normal for a brother to be held accountable for the misdeeds of his siblings and a son to be held accountable for the crimes of his father. Individuals who are perceived to have close ties to a particular sect are stigmatised, leading to social and economic marginalisation. People in small towns know very well who has family connections to

members of the sect. Families belonging to a particular sect frequently have trouble getting jobs or other professional opportunities. Youngsters who have family ties to a sect face additional challenges when trying to enroll in school as a result of the stigma associated with them. Even in cases where these kids get past these obstacles and enroll in school, they frequently talk about being bullied-sometimes to the point where it makes them feel like quitting. Fear and stigmatisation in communities of return have been exacerbated by some communities' outspoken refusals to permit the reintegration of sect families or their portrayal as a threat to national security (Revkin, 2021).

iii. Misplaced Fears

Beliefs and the resultant fear remain inimical to insurgent reintegration to society. Apparently, understanding the artifactual and circumstantial nature of social and religious beliefs is essential when addressing post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa (Richards, 2006). Specifically, in northeast, Nigeria, for fear that finishing the reintegration process would be tantamount to admitting guilt about belonging to a particular sect, many insurgent returnees refuse to proceed. This fear was not unfounded, given the comparatively high rate of reprisals against insurgents who have returned. Indeed, reprisals against former rebels have increased their fear and reluctance to stop participating in the DDR process and instead commit recidivism to carry on with their life of insurgency (Revkin, 2021). Another major source of misplaced fear is that insurgents feel they are made to jettison their previous lives of insurgency and then often used as "spanners to fasten bolts, after the bolts have been fastened, we are sidelined" (Gear, 2002, p. 12).

iv. Weak State and Ineffective Bureaucracy

DDR procedures aim to reintegrate insurgents into society, but because of shoddy and ineffective bureaucracy, obtaining the necessary documentation to lead a normal life is frequently a difficult process. The Nigerian state and its government remain guilty of being notorious for having lax bureaucracy that makes it difficult for potential returnee insurgents to obtain civil documentation. Insurgents are forced to endure needless suffering in order to receive basic services such as healthcare, education, and humanitarian aid because the government claims there are not enough funds (Revkin, 2021).

v. Violent Retaliation

Whereas in some climes familial and community relations facilitates insurgent defection, demobilisation reintegration (Suarez & Baines, 2022), it is not the case in most other societies in Africa. In northeast, Nigeria, a more serious effect of the stigmatisation of families with former members of a sect was the occurrence of violent retaliation, such as revenge killings, in addition to the previously mentioned social, economic, and educational exclusion. Tribal laws, which has a long history in Nigerian rural areas where state authority is less strong than in cities, places a great deal of weight on the idea that the family or tribe of the criminal both bears collective guilt. Nigerians continue to practice revenge killings and other violent acts of retaliation against the families of perpetrators, even in cases where the concept of collective guilt is marginal and individual criminal responsibility is emphasised.

In sect-related situations in northeast, Nigeria, kinship ties to the group are deemed adequate justification for retaliation, even in cases where the relatives of the sect members have not committed any crimes themselves. Even in cases where tribal customs are loose, many Nigerians view the police and the courts as corrupt and ineffectual, which has led some to believe that the only way they can obtain justice is by using extralegal violence.

In addition, revenge killings, physical assaults, property destruction, and forced relocation are

examples of retaliatory violence against families who are thought to have ties to a particular sect. Many families who believe they belong to a particular sect have stated that they would prefer to stay in Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) than run the risk of experiencing violent reprisals in their hometowns (Revkin, 2021).

6. DDR and Organised Crime

It is widely discerned of the several ways in which organised crime and conflict converge; especially, in context of the participants and their motivations, strategies, and financial prospects. Criminal actors can take advantage of these gaps in conflict settings, which are characterised by weakening social, economic, and security institutions, the absence of state authority, shortages of goods and services for local populations, emerging war economies, etc. Additionally, they provide a favorable environment for the growth of illegal activities such as the trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons, as well as the exploitation of natural resources. In addition, the money made from these illegal activities gives conflict parties and individual fighters financial, social, and frequently political incentives to continue fighting.

DDR initiatives need to address organised crime if they are to be successful. Recognising the part organised crime plays in armed conflict is essential to solving the issues that lead to, intensify, and prolong conflict at the expense of long-term peace. DDR and its involvement with organised crime is unquestionably a safe way to reduce risks like the chance of a violent relapse or potential return to illegal activity. The following section clarifies/addresses the role that criminal activities play in armed conflict:

i. Triggers the Outbreak of Conflict

When resources, governance, and social and economic opportunities are not distributed fairly, organised crime frequently results. People and groups who experience economic and political marginalisation often turn to the black market or illicit economy, and the benefits to society that come with engaging in these activities can grow over time. In a similar vein, marginalised groups may grow more and more distrustful of formal economies as well as the social and political networks that exclude them. This frequently renders taking part in illegal activity and armed conflict alluring and justifiable. In a similar vein, money obtained illegally through criminal activity denies the government funding for initiatives like development, health care, and education.

ii. Escalates and Sustains Conflict

Illicit and informal economies are susceptible to being taken over by armed groups once armed conflict has broken out, turning them into both criminal and war economies. Criminal economies and war economies can coexist by giving armed groups cash support as well as weapons and ammunition. Armed groups that sell violence to provide protection or reinforcement of a flow under extortion schemes frequently use it as a tool to facilitate or control the illicit movement of goods. While some armed groups may use violent governance to impose their will on the people within their captured territory, in other instances they may use organised crime to strengthen their authority by serving as local communities' legitimate political and economic regulators.

For instance, illegal money made by armed groups involved in criminal activity may be utilised to support social services and shield supporters and citizens in marginalised communities from predatory organisations, especially in situations where the government is ineffective, nonexistent, or corrupt. Armed groups have the ability to shield local livelihoods from state efforts to repress illicit activities when the illicit economy is the primary or only source of income for the community. In times of armed conflict, when

goods and services are scarce, marginalised communities rely even more on the informal economy to survive.

When armed forces and groups conquer territory during an armed conflict, they may also get access to unofficial marketplaces and unofficial trade in both legal and illegal goods. They can use this access to intensify their military operations. Under these conditions, rent-seeking dynamics between armed groups and local communities and other actors develop in addition to direct engagement in criminal activities. These dynamics are based on the threat of violence or the idea that locals are being protected from other predatory groups.

iii. Undermines Peace

Even after an armed conflict and its war economy officially end, criminal economies run the risk of becoming ingrained in the political, social, and economic fabric of a state. The livelihoods of civilians might still be reliant on illegal activities that they engaged in during the conflict. Patterns of corruption created by state actors during times of war might also persist, especially in areas with lax legal protections. This could obstruct the growth of efficient governing institutions and make it more difficult to establish lasting peace and stability.

Even in a post-conflict setting, the transition to peace may be hampered by the widespread availability of weapons and ammunition as a result of stockpile mismanagement, former combatants holding onto their weapons, and trafficking in weapons by armed forces and groups. The strategic use of violence can be employed to upset the balance of power and resources, especially, in states undergoing transition where criminal violence has flared up. Unsettlingly, in areas where armed groups provide support and protection to communities, the public begins to view combatants as legitimate. State institutions may lose out to armed groups that defend local livelihoods, even when they are earned illegally, in terms of widespread political and social capital. In situations where organised crime becomes entrenched, conflict may flare up again.

7. DDR and Natural Resources

One sector that is prone to crime and criminality in conflict settings is the illicit exploitation of natural resources (such as oil, natural gas, diamonds, minerals, forests and water) by combatants during conflicts and even ex-combatants who see exploitation of natural resources as a way of economic sustainability (UNEP & UNDP, 2013). These scenarios often set in when natural resources are not managed well in course of a DDR process.

Therefore, despite being widely acknowledged, the significance of natural resource management throughout the DDR process in conflict and post-conflict settings cannot be overstated. Natural resources are notorious in contributing to the outbreak, financing, and sustenance of conflict; which in their joint cooperation undermines peacemaking. Research shows that over a 60-year period, land and natural resources were linked to at least 40% of internal conflicts (Alao, 2007; Sini et al, 2021).

This association raises the possibility of a conflict relapse in the first five years after hostilities end. Programmes for DDR must consider these connections in order to prevent escalating possible conflicts, minimise adverse environmental effects that may jeopardise reintegration efforts, and make the most of the opportunities for livelihoods provided by the sustainable use of natural resources. In particular, natural resources are frequently involved in the actions of armed forces and other groups during conflicts, as these resources may be utilised to finance such activities. They could also start, intensify, and prolong hostilities, or they could impede, delay, or even reverse peace efforts (Haysom & Kane, 2009).

As a consequence, DDR processes must engage in deliberate efforts to ensure that it does not encourage practices, amongst others, that harm the sustainability of natural resources and the livelihood sources of those that depend on natural resources; ensure gender responsiveness and equity of men, women, boys and girls in access and participation in natural resource use and the necessity to recognise, raise awareness and address the linkages between natural resources and DDR.

8. DDR and International Standards

The Cairo Declaration on September 22, 2011, on counterterrorism and the rule of law urged members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) to create best practices for an efficient criminal justice system response to all forms of violent extremism (VE), including those pertaining to international cooperation. On November 3–4, 2011, the Criminal Justice Sector/Rule of Law Working Group of the GCTF convened in Washington, D.C., to talk about the involvement of criminal justice authorities in the VE investigation and disruption of operations. The outcome of this conversation and the meeting that followed on February 7-8, 2012 in Rabat, was good criminal justice on counter VE practices (Schwartz et al, 2015).

All states are encouraged to adopt these non-binding best practices in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, while acknowledging that their application must be compliant with both national and international law, taking into account the diverse histories, cultures, and legal systems of the various states. They are also urged to put into practice the GCTF good practices for countering violent extremism, which are predicated on the need for a strong criminal justice system that can handle common crimes while upholding the human rights of the accused.

The Working Group acknowledges that, while fully adhering to applicable international law and advancing the rule of law, the main goal of any successful criminal justice response to any form of violent extremism (VE) is to stop acts of VE before they cause the greatest amount of harm. The GCTF urged all states to take into account the following non-exhaustive list of suggested best practices for a successful criminal justice system response to VE that is based on the rule of law:

a. Criminal Procedure Tools Related Good Practices

i. "Protect victims, witnesses, informants, undercover agents, juries, investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges in counterterrorism cases;

ii. Encourage cooperation and coordination among domestic government agencies that have responsibilities or information relevant to counterterrorism;

iii. Provide a legal framework and practical measures for undercover investigations of terrorist suspects or organisations;

iv. Provide a legal framework and practical measures for electronic surveillance in counterterrorism investigations;

v. Adopt incentives for terrorist suspects and others to cooperate in counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions;

vi. Enact measures to protect sensitive law enforcement and intelligence information in terrorism cases;

vii. Provide for the lawful exercise of pretrial detention of terrorist suspects;

viii. Provide for the professional development of investigators, prosecutors, and judges who handle terrorism cases;

ix. Develop practices and procedures to encourage international cooperation in

counterterrorism matters;

x. Develop and use forensic evidence to determine the identities of those involved in terrorist acts;

xi. Ensure that convicted terrorists are appropriately punished and develop policies for their incarceration and reintegration;

b. Criminal Offenses Related Good Practices

xii. Criminalise terrorism offenses as outlined in the applicable international conventions and protocols;

xiii. Criminalise conspiracies, solicitation and other preparatory acts of terrorism;

xiv. Criminalise attempts to commit and aiding and abetting terrorist acts; and,

xv. Criminalise terrorist financing" (GCTF, 2011, pp. 3-14).

For the best of any DDR endeavour to enterprise and flourish, it is incumbent on the peace practice community to widely consult and implement these good practices. The 2015 GCTF good practice tools are also complemented by several related GCFT framework documents as indicated in Table 1; which the peace practice community should consult:

Location	Framework Document
Abu Dhabi	Memorandum for good practices for education and countering violent ex
Abu Dhabi	Action plan for education and countering violent extremism (CVE)
Ankara	Memorandum on good practices for a multisectoral approach to counterin extremism
Not Specified	Good practices on community engagement and community-oriented policing to counter violent extremism
Doha	Plan action for community-oriented policing in a countering violent extremis context
Not specified	Good practices on women and countering violent extremism
Not specified	The role of families in preventing and countering violent extremism: recommendations and programming options
Zurich-London	Recommendations on preventing and countering violent extremism an online
Not Specified	Addendum to the GCTF good practices on women and counte extremismwith a focus on mainstreaming gender
Not Specified	Memorandum on good practices on strengthening national-local cooper preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism
Brussels	Memorandum on good practices for oversight and accountability me counterterrorism
The Hague	Memorandum on good practices for the judiciary in adjudicating terrorisr
Rabat	Memorandum on good practices for effective counterterrorism practice ir justice sector
Not Specified	Recommendations for using and protecting intelligence information in rul based, criminal justice sector-led investigations and prosecutions
Not Specified	Plan of action for identifying and countering terrorist recruiters and facili
Not Specified	Neuchâtel memorandum on good practices for juvenile justice in a cou context
Not Specified	Recommendations on the effective use of appropriate alternative r terrorism-related offenses
Not Specified	Valletta recommendations relating to contributions by parliamentarians i an effective response to terrorism
Abuja, Nigeria	Recommendations on the collection, use and sharing of evidence for pu criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects
Not Specified	Glion recommendations on the use of rule of law-based administrative meas counterterrorism context
Not Specified	Memorandum on criminal justice approaches to the linkages between terror core international crimes, sexual and gender-based violence crimes, human tr migrant smuggling, slavery, and crimes against children
Not Specified	Rome memorandum on good practices for rehabilitation and reintegrati extremist offenders
The Hague-Marrakech	Memorandum on good practices for a more effective response to the FTF p
Not specified	Good practices on addressing the challenge of returning families of for fighters
Rabat-Washington	Good practices on the prevention, detection, intervention and response to the terrorism
Not Specified	Good practices memorandum for the implementation countering the fina terrorism measures while safeguarding civic space
The Antalya	Memorandum on good practices on the protection of soft targets in a cou context
Madrid	Memorandum on good practices for assistance to victims of terrorism after the attack and in criminal proceedings
Algiers	Memorandum on good practices for preventing and denying the benefits of kidnapping for ransom by t errorists .
Not Specified	Good practices in the area of border security and management in the context of counterterrorism and stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters .
New York	Memorandum on goo d practices for interdicting terrorist travel .
The Hague	Good practices on the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism .
Berlin	Memorandum on good practices for countering terrorist use of unmanned aerial systems .

9. Reinsertion Assistance in the DDR Process

No doubt, DDR needs to be combined with additional political, social, and economic reforms in order to prevent future conflict and bring about stability. Therefore, a larger framework for recovery and development must inform the conception, design, planning, and implementation of any particular DDR endeavour. Usually, several measures are provided after demobilisation; including cash; in-kind kit like clothes, domestic tools, food and agricultural tools; meeting needs related to shelter by either cash subsidy or material items like roofing sheets) and free health services (Colletta, et al, 1996; Knight, & Orzerdem, 2004).

Whereas the aforementioned forms of reinsertion assistance to ex-insurgents are often adopted, the payment of cash is more commonly adopted. The salience for reinsertion assistance like cash payment is premised that:

> Upon discharge, an ex-combatant loses his/her source of (formal or informal) income. Immediately thereafter, s/he is normally in a critical financial situation until s/he can generate income through self-/employment. During this period (the 'reinsertion' phase), an ex-combatant is in need of special assistance ('transitional safety net') to cover the basic material needs of him/herself and his/her family. (Kostner, 2001, p. 1)

After demobilisation, the cash assistance must be customised to the specific needs of each former insurgent. It may be granted as a lump sum or on a monthly basis. It is important to establish and apply assistance criteria transparently, as not all former combatants will need the same level of support upon their reintegration.

Although, cash payments to former combatants are a regular feature of DDR programmes, their use and advantages are hotly debated in donor and academic circles about the benefits and risks of using them (Isima, 2004; Hanlon et al, 2010; Subedi, 2014). Influenced by two experiences of cash handouts to soldiers in Mozambique, Hanlon (2004) served as a succour to soldiers and insurgents. Similarly, Willibald (2006) argues that "empirical evidence shows that any potential disadvantages of using cash in DDR are surmountable, making it possible to answer the question 'does money work; with a simple yes". On the contrary, GSDRC (2011) argues that there is conflicting data regarding the effectiveness of cash payments in DDR programmes and that experiences have not always been favourable. Likewise, Molloy (2017, p. 90) argues that:

> Direct cash payments should be the smallest part of any benefit package. Food and other goods and services (tools, seeds, counseling, etc.) are a better option…Participation in community-based quick-impact projects for short-term livelihood support should be linked to the receipt of reinsertion assistance, particularly any cash payments.

The foregoing scholarly and donor accounts and debates on the merit of cash payment or otherwise in DDR process are summarised in Table 2.

Potential Benefits of Cash in DDR	Potential Drawbacks of Cash in DDR
Can be attractive to former combatants, provided it is at a scale that meets their expectations in a timely manner.	Can fuel expectations and increase security risks. In light of political manipulation and hype, it will be difficult to meet the high expectations of former combatants without a significant public information campaign and proactive management of expectations.
With assured cash flows and effective delivery systems, cash elements can contribute to the stabilisation of the programme and the broader peace process.	There is little margin for error regarding cash flows, timing and delivery systems. Small problems such as delays in cash delivery can lead to spontaneous violence.
Provision of cash elements early in the demobilisation phase of a DDR process can accelerate the demobilisation process and return of former combatants to civilian life.	It may be expected that party or local commanders might deduct a significant percentage of cash paid to former combatants on payment or at source, as has been alleged to be the practice with payments made to cadres inside the cantonments.
Cash payments can offset or delay political and civil unrest contributed to by former combatants when other in-kind elements of their rehabilitation package are delayed or do not meet their expectations.	Cash elements of rehabilitation/reintegration processes frequently contribute to community resentment. The community and most war-affected populations are not receiving significant cash transfers and could consider former combatants are being unfairly privileged.
Cash elements can soften the burden of returning former combatants to the community through the capacity to spread benefits to the local economy.	Former combatants may have little experience in financial management and could miss the opportunity to optimise sustainable benefits.
Cash payments are easier and cheaper to administer and implement than material or in-kind support.	They can contribute security risks associated with transporting and delivering cash, in addition to a heightening risk to those receiving payment, who will be broadly known to be in possession of cash in their communities.
Can stimulate institutional capacity building through local government or local peace committee administration of cash disbursements and so forth.	Cash payment procedures can be compromised by local institutions. For example, if local institutions such as local peace committees, were engaged in delivery, could one expect full accountability and transparency?
Cash elements can stimulate local economies, particularly in the informal sector, over the broad geographical spread of former combatant resettlement.	Cash transfers without sustainable in-kind support—training, education or entrepreneurial—will have a short-term impact.
The influx of significant regular cash payments can stimulate the development of community infrastructural capacity, such as cooperatives or local banking.	Significant resources in the hands of returning former combatants can undermine community social structures by offering coercive power to a volatile group with political aspirations.
The transfer of a modest transitional security allowance can have significant impact in contributing to long-term sustainability.	Cash transfers associated with disarmament may contribute to the perception of a programme that offers arms for cash, which may enhance the marketability of small arms and can also stimulate the proliferation of armed gangs.
Cash can allow former combatants to finance their return into the family and community, overcoming traditional and political prejudice. Such prejudices include the stigmatisation of girls and adverse community perceptions of their characters as a result of their time in the cantonment.	Possession of cash by girls, in particular, returning to their traditional roles in feudal communities can seriously undermine their personal security. This is so when they are not deemed by the community as eligible to own significant personal resources.
Cash offers former combatants a flexible and dignified choice regarding the direction of their own futures.	Cash can become the main objective of the programme in the minds of beneficiaries and associates, to the expense of sustainable inputs.
As above	The sudden influx of cash to a community and the demand for local commodities and resources (e.g., property, local produce, etc.) can have a significant inflationary impact on the local economy.
Cash can adapt to i ndividual needs and affords beneficiaries the choice to acquire the goods and services they need and when they need them.	Cash can be used to buy anything and can therefore be misused for the consumption of 'demerit' goods and services.
Cash transfers ca n have the positive effect of empowering beneficiaries to take charge of their lives.	Donors and recipient governments may favour traditional in -kind transfers over cash assistance
Cash transfers can be used directly to meet livelihood needs.	Cash is of l ittle use if supply does not meet demand.

Source s: Molloy, 2017, pp. 91 -92 ; Wilibald, 2006, p. 322 .

However, the pros and cons surrounding cash payments, there is some consensus that:

a. "Where cash payments are necessary, they should be paid in small instalments over an extended period of time;

b. The UN's Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) recommend cash should be linked to employment or services performed by the ex-combatant for the benefit of the community;

c. There should be some engagement with ex-combatants on how cash payments will be used.

d. Cash payments have not been effective when used during the disarmament phase. They can be misperceived as 'cash for weapons' and may be misused to buy drugs, alcohol, or more weapons

e. Reviews have highlighted that reintegration programmes which focus solely on cash payments, without parallel livelihood and investment support, risk failing to help beneficiaries to save or make productive use of their allowances and make little contribution to ex-combatants' long-term economic reintegration.

f. The overall risks and benefits of cash payments should be set against the risks and benefits of the alternative: in-kind transfers.

g. Cash payments should not be provided to children

h. In the case of male ex-combatants, spouses should be engaged in discussion about how the money should be spent. Experience shows that male ex-combatants tend to spend the cash payments on themselves with a small amount going to family, whereas, women tend to use it towards their children's education" (GSDRC, 2011, pp. 2-3).

10. Strengths and Weaknesses of DDR

This section asks what DDR can do and cannot do. It insists that DDR initiatives are a logical progression of peace processes. They, therefore, necessitate a thorough, coordinated, and integrated approach from the stages of planning to implementation. The DDR process's three stages are neither distinct nor unrelated to one another. In actuality, overlap in all three phases is possible and typically occurs. The peace process may be in danger if there are issues at any point during the DDR process. Failure to disarm and demobilise former combatants, for instance, may result in a return to hostilities or the emergence of low-level criminal activity, both of which could eventually jeopardize the peace process (Knight, 2008).

The maintenance of peace depends on the DDR process. For this reason, national, regional, and international peace initiatives are placing a high premium on DDR measures. However, DDR initiatives do not ensure that peace will be maintained or occur automatically. Because of this, it is critical to be realistic about what DDR procedures can and cannot accomplish. Several claims regarding the capabilities of these programs can be made based on experience. DDR processes can help contribute to a climate of security sufficient for the promotion of confidence-building between warring factions and between ex-combatants and non combatants The separation of combatants and the dismantling of command structures are two examples of how DDR programmes can help establish a safe and stable environment in which a peace process can take root.

They can give rebel groups a way to give up their weapons without looking like losers—a face saving process. The DDR procedures provide a means of fostering trust between former combatants and noncombatants and fostering an atmosphere that facilitates the advancement of other aspects of the peace process, such as elections, economic recovery,

security sector reform (SSR) (Civic & Miklaucic, 2010); and the repair of damaged infrastructure. Last but not least, DDR programmes can be helpful in starting a process that could lead to former combatants altering their identities and habits while offering a safety net for them and their close family members.

However, DDR has its limitations. DDR procedures, for instance, do not take the place of insufficient political will of parties to participate in a political process that will allow them to put down their weapons and settle their differences amicably. DDR procedures cannot stop a conflict from starting again or replace peace enforcement efforts. Although, DDR procedures can help former combatants reintegrate into society, they cannot ensure that this process will be successful. Finally, it should not be attempted to replace the disarmament phase of DDR with longer-term programmes that truly address the issue of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), though, the first phase of any DDR programme should lead to the disarmament of former combatants.

11. Conclusion

This chapter provides a guide to understanding DDR. It did not ask specific questions and; instead discusses interconnected themes related to DDR discourses. In so doing it contributes to several important debates in the DDR literature. In particular, the chapter touches on themes like hiccups to reintegration of insurgents to society, the role of natural resources in either encouraging or hindering a peace process, the salience in adopting international best practices and standards in guiding a given DDR endeavour, DDR and gender issues, the necessity or otherwise of cash payments (reinsertion assistance) in peace process and what DDR can do and cannot do.

The chapter is, however, not oblivious that there are several other DDR related themes that are not considered here; which should compel the need for further research. Possible areas for further research in DDR may include DDR and child soldiers, DDR and the UN, etc. Though the chapter did not ask definite questions, it makes the following recommendations:

a. DDR should be an essential component of the peace talks, the peace deals with the results, and the peace process that follows;

b. It is imperative that DDR be viewed as a single, integrated process that does not distinguish between the two Ds and the R;

c. When it comes to DDR, the different stakeholders should adopt a thorough, coordinated, and long-lasting strategy;

d. Since DDR and post-conflict accommodation between former adversaries are symbiotic, true national reconciliation should be fostered;

e. Ensuring the human security of former combatants through efficient DDR promotes national security and regime stability, fulfilling the pledge of DDR to assist peacebuilding; and,

f. Given that returnee insurgents frequently commit crimes of recidivism, it is necessary to establish an independent monitoring group to verify and keep an eye on the commitments made by parties to a peace process to desist from extremist violence.

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